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The magnitude of the ongoing world financial meltdown and its real economic effects has 
lessened the focus on another set of major international financial issues that had been the 
center of significant attention in recent years: large global imbalances and their links to 
the global reserve system.  Rising public sector debts and the massive monetary 
expansion in the United States, coupled with the highly uneven macroeconomic policy 
stimulus taking place throughout the world are two major reasons why renewed attention 
has to be paid to these issues. 
This chapter analyzes the basic deficiencies that the global reserve system 
exhibits and its links with global imbalances.  It is divided into four sections.  The first 
examines the basic deficiencies of the system.  The second and third sections look in 
greater detail at the instability and inequities of the system.  The last section considers 
how the reserve system could be reformed. 
 
The deficiencies of the current system 
 
The global reserve system exhibits three fundamental flaws.  All of them are associated 
with the essential fact that the system lacks mechanisms to guarantee that balance of 
payments surpluses and deficits (i.e. global imbalances) compensate each other without 
having adverse effects on world economic activity.  Most of the deficiencies generate 
global deflationary biases but some can also generate inflationary risks.2 
The first problem, which was highlighted by John M. Keynes during the debates 
that preceded the creation of the Bretton Woods arrangements, is that the current global 
monetary system—as all international monetary systems that preceded it—is tilted 
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against deficit countries.  This tends to generate a global deflationary bias: the 
adjustments that deficit countries have to adopt to balance their external accounts, when 
financing is not available in sufficient amounts (or if those deficits and associated 
financing are not deemed desirable), will not be matched by expansionary policies in 
surplus countries, which do not face a similar pressure to adjust.  This bias becomes 
profound particularly during periods of generalized balance of payments crises, such as 
the one we are experiencing today.  The Bretton Woods arrangements were born with this 
intrinsic imperfection since the International Clearing Union, the proposal by Keynes 
(1942-43) to create a more symmetric system, was not accepted.  Its very imperfect 
substitute, the “scarce currency clause,” has never been used.  We will refer to this 
problem as the anti-Keynesian bias. 
The second deficiency, which is generally referred to in the literature as the Triffin 
dilemma after the pioneering work of Robert Triffin (1961, 1968), is associated with the 
fact that an international reserve system based on a national currency (the U.S. dollar)—
and, more generally, on a limited number of national or regional currencies (the euro 
today)—has a built-in instability.  The only way for the rest of the world to accumulate 
net dollar assets is for the U.S. to run a current account deficit.  However, U.S. deficits 
and associated deteriorations in its net external balance sheet tend to erode confidence in 
the dollar as a reserve currency.  This loss may then force adjustments to restore 
credibility—or, more generally, reverse dollar depreciation—, but this could make the 
deflationary bias of the system felt. 
It must be underscored that, aside from this “exorbitant privilege” (to borrow de 
Gaulle’s characterization of the role of the dollar in the global reserve system) of 
 3
receiving transfers from the rest of the world (appropriating seignorage powers), its 
position at the center of the global reserve system gives the U.S. the additional privilege 
of running a truly independent monetary policy.  The basic reason for this is the 
perception (and consequent use) of U.S. Treasury bills as the “safest assets” in the world 
economy, which implies that the determinants of U.S. interest rates are relatively 
independent of the exchange rate of the U.S. dollar against other currencies.  This is 
contrary to what is usually assumed in open macroeconomic models, in which runs on 
currencies tend to be associated with upward pressures on domestic interest rates, a result 
that is consistent with the experience of most countries facing balance of payments crises. 
The major constraint that the U.S. faced in running an independent monetary 
policy was the possibility of other countries transforming their dollar reserves into gold, 
but this constraint was lifted in the early 1970s, when the system evolved from the “gold-
exchange standard” to what is effectively a “fiduciary dollar standard”—and only 
secondarily a system of competing fiduciary reserve currencies.  Given the lack of 
constraints, we are living in a world in which the monetary policy of the major reserve 
currency country can alternatively generate excessive liquidity in the international 
economy or cause contractionary global effects, which make themselves felt during 
different phases of the business cycle.  In this sense, the generation of global liquidity has 
become even more “capricious” than under the original Bretton Woods system, to use a 
characterization that was common in the debates of the 1960s.  As we will see below, this 
has been reflected in increasingly intense cycles of the U.S. current account deficits, 
which have been closely linked with strong fluctuations in the real dollar exchange rate.  
Furthermore, to the extent that the U.S. does not regard the actual or likely weakening of 
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its currency as a problem to be corrected, the absence of any constraint on U.S. monetary 
policy implies that, contrary to Keynes’ classical views on the deflationary bias of the 
global reserve system, a fiduciary dollar standard can actually exhibit, over certain 
periods, the opposite phenomenon: an inflationary bias.  However, although the U.S. is 
able to spend generously, it does not totally capture the benefits of its expansionary 
policies, as they are “exported” to the rest of the world through deterioration in the 
current account of its balance of payments. 
The third deficiency of the current reserve system is that it is inequitable, as the 
demand for foreign exchange reserves forces developing countries to transfer resources to 
the countries issuing those reserve currencies—a case of “reverse aid” (see the Zedillo 
report published as United Nations, 2001).  We will refer to this problem as the inequity 
bias.  It has been magnified in recent decades of financial and capital market 
liberalization by the pressures generated by strongly pro-cyclical flows that developing 
countries face in world financial markets, which in turn reduce their room to undertake 
counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies.  These facts have led to a massive 
accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by developing countries as “self-insurance” 
or, better, “self-protection” against reversals in capital inflows.  This adds up to the more 
traditional “precautionary” demand for reserves in commodity exporting countries 
against commodity price volatility and, more generally in today’s export-led economies, 
against international trade volatility.3 
The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves can also be seen as rational 
responses by individual countries to a system that lacks any well functioning “collective 
insurance” against balance of payments crises.  Furthermore, the fact that the only 
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available collective insurance, International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) emergency 
financing, is deemed unacceptable by many countries due to its conditionalities, actually 
heightens the demand for self-protection.  In this sense, self-protection by developing 
countries is the demand for foreign exchange reserves associated with both pro-cyclical 
capital account and trade shocks, and the perception that there are inadequate 
mechanisms at the global level to provide liquidity to developing countries during 
balance of payments crises.  Although rational from each country’s perspective, such 
protection generates “fallacy of composition” effects that tend to worsen global 
imbalances and generate deflationary bias in the global system.  We will call this problem 
the inequity-instability link. 
Although the inequities of the system were already built into its initial post-war 
design, they have been considerably heightened since the 1990s by the increased opening 
of developing countries—trade opening, domestic financial liberalization, and capital 
account liberalization—and the risks they generated.  In fact, the major waves of foreign 
exchange reserve accumulation followed the two major crises experienced by the 
developing world—the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, and the succession of 
Asian, Russian and Latin American crises of the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries—which made evident that these risks are substantial.  
Viewed from the perspective of creditors, pro-cyclicality is obviously a response 
to the “riskiness” associated with lending to developing countries.  What this implies, 
however, is that this riskiness is not independent of the position these countries occupy in 
the global economy and in the global reserve system in particular.  This is therefore, part 
of the essential asymmetries of the international economic system—that is, one of its 
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“center-periphery” features, to use a concept that was made popular by Raúl Prebisch half 
a century ago, and one that is used commonly today, even in mainstream literature. 
It is important to emphasize that the three basic problems the current system 
exhibits would not be solved if several national (or, in the case of Europe, regional) 
currencies compete for the status of international reserve currencies—which is a 
secondary feature of the current world monetary system.  In particular, although such a 
multi-reserve currency arrangement would provide developing countries the benefit of 
diversification of their foreign exchange reserve assets, the seignorage powers would still 
be concentrated in the industrial countries, so that reverse aid continues to be a feature of 
the system.  
Exchange rate flexibility would allow a full-fledged system of competing reserve 
currencies to be resilient to the attacks on fixed parities that led to the collapse of both 
bimetallism in the late nineteenth century and of gold-dollar parities in the early 1970s.  
However, it adds an additional element of instability to a purely dollar-based system 
associated with the exchange rate volatility among major reserve currencies—a problem 
that is already present in the current system.  Such volatility results in major gains and 
losses by central banks on their reserve holding, a feature that increases the risk 
associated with holding specific reserve assets and, therefore, their value as what they are 
meant to be: “safe” or low-risk assets.  Equally important, if the central banks were to 
respond to exchange rate fluctuations by changing the composition of their international 
reserves, this would feed into exchange rate instability.  Under these conditions, a full 
fledged multiple currency reserve system would generate growing calls for a fixed 
exchange rate arrangement (i.e. a return to a Bretton Woods type scheme, at least among 
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reserve currencies), but fixing the exchange rates among major currencies in a world of 
large and free capital flows would be a daunting task.  It must be added that, given their 
high demand for foreign exchange reserves, developing countries suffer disproportionally 
from the instability of the exchange rates of reserve currencies. 
In any case, this will continue to be a secondary feature of the system so long as 
there is no alternative supply of safe assets in the world economy.  The bonds of some 
European governments and Japan can be a substitute, but only a partial one, given the 
size and liquidity of the market for U.S. Treasury bonds.  This problem is magnified by 
the absence of a unified European bond market and the perception by many agents that 
the euro is backed by a heterogeneous group of countries, with unequal strength. 
This implies that the major deficiencies in the current system can only be solved 
through an overhaul of the global reserve system.  Although some other possibilities 
could be designed—such as Keynes’ proposal for an International Clearing Union and 
similar solutions (see, for example, D’Arista, 1999)4—the most viable is completing the 
transition that was launched in the 1960s with the creation of the Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs).  This implies putting a truly global fiduciary currency at the center of the system, 
completing a trend towards fiduciary currencies that has been at the center of national and 
international monetary systems since the nineteenth century (Triffin, 1968).  Given the 
pro-cyclicality of finance towards developing countries, and the high demand for foreign 
exchange reserves that it generates, this has to be accompanied by reforms aimed at 
guaranteeing that SDR allocations are used to at least partly correct the problems that 
developing countries face under the current system.  
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The Instability of the Global Reserve System 
 
The cyclical recurrence of U.S. imbalances is closely related to the nature of the current 
global reserve system.  A global deflationary bias was evident in the early post-war 
period in the form of the “dollar shortage”.  The gradual accumulation of dollar reserves 
later generated a pressure on U.S. gold reserves that major countries tried to avoid 
through the creation of the “gold pool” (Eichengreen, 2007).  The failure of this 
arrangement and the increasingly inflationary bias that the system exhibited, associated 
with increasing U.S. deficits, led to the abandonment of the gold-dollar parities in the 
early 1970s.  In any case, during the gold-exchange standard, the U.S. generally ran 
current account surpluses, and the provision of dollar liquidity to the rest of the world 
was made through the capital account. 
In contrast, under the fiduciary dollar standard that followed, the current account 
deficits of the United States have been the rule rather than the exception.  The system has 
also been plagued over the past three and a half decades by an increasingly intense cycle 
of expansion and contraction in the external deficit of the United States, which has been 
associated in turn with strong fluctuations of the real exchange rate of the major reserve 
currency (see Figure 16.1, and Ocampo, Kregel and Griffith-Jones, 2007, ch. 4).  
Although real exchange rate fluctuations have played an important role, corrections in the 
U.S. current account deficit have also been associated with U.S. slowdowns or recessions 
that have had major effects on the world economy.  
 
<Insert Figure 16.1> 
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The first but short cycle of this type was experienced in the second half of the 
1970s: rising deficits in 1977-78 followed by the strong contractionary monetary policy 
adopted in late 1979, largely to fight inflation which, together with the real depreciation 
of the dollar, corrected the U.S. deficit but generated a strong global slowdown.  A longer 
and stronger cycle was experienced in the 1980s.  During the first half of that decade, 
contractionary monetary policy, mixed with expansionary fiscal policy later on, led to a 
substantial appreciation of the U.S. dollar, and a sharp deterioration of the U.S. current 
account.  The adjustment was initiated prior to but was accelerated by the 1985 Plaza 
Accord.  The market response produced a sharp real depreciation of the dollar, and led to 
the Louvre Accord of 1987, which sought to stabilize the dollar.5 Following two sharp 
falls in equity markets, in 1987 and 1989, the correction of the current account deficit 
was again the joint effect of real exchange rate depreciation and the U.S. recession of the 
early 1990s.  Deterioration of U.S. economic activity led, again, to the global slowdown 
of 1989-91. 
The adjustment of the deficit in the United States during the late 1980s was 
matched by a rebalancing of surpluses in Germany and a few other developed countries, a 
number of developing countries in Asia and, as a result of falling petroleum prices, in oil-
exporting developing countries.  In contrast, Japan’s large external surplus remained 
stubbornly high, even though the yen appreciated significantly against the dollar since the 
mid-1980s.  This experience showed that currency appreciation in a surplus country may 
not necessarily correct external imbalances.  The real appreciation may have actually fed 
into the asset price bubble, which contributed to the financial crisis and stagnation of the 
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Japanese economy during the 1990s; the latter phenomenon in turn swamped the effects 
of real exchange rate on the current account.6 
U.S. deficits returned after the 1989-91 global slowdown, but were moderate 
during the first half of the 1990s.  The renewed appreciation of the U.S. dollar in the 
second half of that decade led to the strongest deterioration of the U.S. current account in 
history.  Although this had its counterpart in a deterioration of U.S. domestic deficits, 
particularly of households, the large magnitude of the current imbalances also reflects 
events taking place outside the U.S. economy.  Particularly important in this regard was 
the sharp divergence between U.S. and world economic growth during a conjuncture 
characterized by recession in many parts of the developing world and the transition 
economies induced by the Asian, Russian and Latin American crises.  As in the past, the 
strong U.S. and global slowdown of 2001 led to a reduction in the U.S. deficit, but such 
reduction was very small due to the aforementioned factors. 
The renewed and sharp increase in the U.S. deficit in the early 2000s can be 
attributed to the joint effect of domestic imbalances and events in the developing world, 
particularly the very strong demand for self-protection (see next section).  The 2003-07 
world economic boom was therefore characterized by large current account deficits of the 
U.S., which continued to widen until 2006, matched by aggregate surpluses in a number 
of other countries, mainly developing countries in East Asia, commodity-exporting 
countries in the rest of the world, and Japan.  The cumulative depreciation of the dollar 
since 2003 was strong but orderly.  However, it was not accompanied, as in the second 
half of the 1980s, by a strong correction in U.S. current account deficits.  These 
imbalances only started to fall with the U.S. slowdown of 2007, indicating again that 
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major corrections in the U.S. current account are joint effects of dollar depreciation and 
U.S. slowdowns, which have global implications.  
These trends have changed significantly during the recent global recession.  As in 
previous recessions, the U.S. current account deficit is narrowing.  In turn, with the 
collapse of commodity prices, the surpluses of commodity exporting countries were 
significantly eroded or washed way.  The collapse of world trade has had similar effects 
on the surpluses of Japan and many East Asian manufacturing exporters, with the major 
exception of China.  Despite the still high current account deficit, the dollar has 
strengthened in late 2008 and early 2009 due to the “flight to safety” that has 
accompanied the world financial collapse, and the demand for dollars to finance 
withdrawals from non-banking financial institutions in the U.S. (an important part of the 
strong deleveraging process underway).  The yen has also been strengthening due to the 
reversal of Japanese carry trade (a phenomenon similar to the demand for dollars 
generated by deleveraging), but the major alternative reserve currency, the euro, has 
shown its incapacity to offer an adequate supply of safe assets. 
This short narrative of U.S. imbalances and exchange rates during the three and a 
half decades under the fiduciary dollar standard indicates also that the role as the center 
of the global reserve system has had both positive and negative aspects for the United 
States.  On the positive side, the most important advantage is the monetary independence 
that it confers.  The fact that the U.S. is both the global reserve currency and means of 
payments generates a demand for dollar reserves that are usually held in deposits and 
liquid instruments paying relatively low interest rates, which also enhance the role of the 
U.S. as the world’s banker. 
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Under the current system, the United States faces an additional advantage.  
Whereas economies that have external liabilities denominated in other countries’ 
currencies experience a net wealth (real balance) loss when their currencies depreciate,7 
this effect is absent in the U.S.  In contrast, the U.S. experiences a positive wealth (real 
balance) effect when the dollar depreciates, as such change increases the value of foreign 
assets owned by U.S. residents, while their liabilities remain invariable.  This implies that 
the depreciation of the U.S. dollar will have weaker effects in terms of rebalancing global 
current account imbalances, as the wealth effects of such depreciation run counter to the 
relative price effects (United Nations, 2005, ch. I). 
On the negative side, the current account deficit that the U.S. has to incur to 
provide a net supply of dollar assets to the rest of the world implies that some of the 
stimulus generated by the expansionary policies of the major reserve issuing country 
must benefit the rest of the world (Stiglitz, 2006, ch. 9).  To the extent that cyclical 
upswings are also characterized by the appreciation of the U.S. dollar, other countries 
also gain during theses phases through the increased real value (in terms of their domestic 
currencies) of assets held in the U.S. 
As we have seen, among the three phases of balance of payments imbalances that 
the U.S. has experienced under the fiduciary dollar standard, the most recent one has 
been larger in magnitude and has lasted longer.  Some analysts have argued that 
deepening global financial integration has made current imbalances more sustainable.  In 
particular, orthodox analysis has always claimed that in a world of perfect capital 
markets, current account imbalances merely reflect private decisions to allocate savings 
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to the places where it is optimal to invest them.  This would imply that current account 
imbalances are, as such, irrelevant. 
Still other analysts have argued that current account imbalances can be sustained 
for a long time, as the system has evolved into a “Second Bretton Woods” (see Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2003).  This school of thought contends that the 
“mercantilist” decision of the Asian countries to avoid exchange rate appreciation to 
sustain their export-led growth models implies that they are willing to continue financing 
U.S. current account deficits.  According to this point of view, the economic benefits of 
stable and weak exchange rates exceed, for those countries, the costs of reserve 
accumulation (see below). 
In contrast to the former views, an increasing number of observers has indicated 
in recent years that the risks associated with the accumulation of a net U.S. debtor 
position imply that official and private agents may be unwilling to continue to 
accumulate dollar assets, due to the possible losses associated with further dollar 
depreciation (see, for instance, Williamson, 2004).  Indeed, the U.S. current account 
deficits in recent years have been problematic, as they have been financing domestic 
consumption rather than investment, U.S. investment has been shifting towards non-
tradable sectors, and the deficit has been increasingly funded by short-term flows rather 
than direct investment (Summers, 2004).  Curiously, these are the same issues that have 
been raised many times in relation to external imbalances of developing countries, most 
notably in Latin America. 
As the defenders of the Second Bretton Woods hypothesis have recently argued 
(Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber, 2009), the current crisis has not been accompanied 
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by a run on the dollar.  The basic reasons, as we have seen, have been the lack of a large 
alternative supply of safe assets and the demand for dollars generated by deleveraging.  
However, this does not imply that the U.S. is safe from a classical balance of payments 
crisis—that is, a run on dollar assets (including Treasury bills) which will force both 
dollar depreciation and an increase in U.S. interest rates.  The sharp rise in the public 
sector debt of the United States and the expansion in the balance sheet of the Federal 
Reserve under way, add up to the accumulated net external liabilities of the United States 
to generate risks in that direction. 
As we will see below, the desire to run a truly independent monetary and fiscal 
policy during the current crisis without having to take into account these global 
implications could actually be a reason why it may be in the interest of the U.S. to move 
to a non-dollar based reserve system.  But even if a classical balance of payments crisis 
does not take place in the U.S., this does not eliminate the basic deficiencies of the 
fiduciary dollar standard, which go beyond that specific risk. 
 
The growing inequities of the global reserve system  
 
The volatility and contagion that characterize financial markets have been demonstrated 
by a long history of successive phases of “appetite for risk” (or, more accurately, 
underestimation of risks) followed by periods of “flight to quality” (risk aversion) 
(Kindleberger, 1978).  These boom-bust cycles follow the endogenous unstable dynamics 
analyzed by Minsky (1982), who argued that financial booms generate excessive risk 
taking by market agents, which eventually leads to crises.  A similar explanation was 
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suggested more recently by White (2005), who underscored how the “search for yield” 
characteristic of low interest rate environments generates incentives for credit creation, 
carry trade, and leverage that easily build up asset bubbles.  The recent boom-bust cycle 
in the U.S. and several other countries is a dramatic demonstration of the validity of this 
view, as are the sharp cycles of financing experienced by the developing world in recent 
decades.  The transmission of shocks, positive and negative, has been enhanced by the 
liberalization of cross-border capital flows and deregulation of domestic financial 
markets. 
An important feature of contagion is the tendency of markets to cluster countries 
and firms in certain risk categories.  Independently of their objective basis, this clustering 
becomes a “self-fulfilling prophecy”: events that take place in one country or firm tend to 
be seen as “representative” of an asset class, and therefore tend to generate reactions that 
affect other members of the cluster.  Thus, as the experience of emerging markets 
indicates, even countries with weak “fundamentals” may be drawn into a financial boom; 
again, with some independence from their fundamentals, they will be later drawn into 
“sudden stops” of external financing. 
The volatility that is inherent in finance is reflected in varying ways in different 
segments of financial markets.  Agents that are perceived to be risky borrowers are 
subject to the strongest swings in terms of both the availability and costs of financing.  
Riskier agents include both some domestic agents in industrial countries (e.g., small and 
medium sized enterprises, poorer households) and emerging markets and, more generally, 
developing country borrowers.  In relation to developing countries, this segmentation of 
global financial markets is deeply rooted in basic asymmetries that characterize the world 
 16
economy (Ocampo and Martin, 2003), which in the financial area involve: (i) constraints 
faced by most developing countries in issuing liabilities in international markets 
denominated in their own currencies, a phenomenon that has come to be called “original 
sin” (Eichengreen and Hausman, 2005); (ii) differences in the degree of domestic 
financial and capital market development, which lead to an under-supply of long-term 
financial instruments in domestic markets; and (iii) the small size of developing 
countries’ domestic financial markets relative to the speculative pressures they potentially 
face. 
The first two asymmetries imply that financial markets are more “incomplete” in 
developing countries and, as a result, portfolios of market agents are characterized by 
variable mixes of currency and maturity mismatches.  It also implies that some financial 
intermediation must be conducted through international markets—to the extent, of 
course, that agents have access to such markets.8 A major implication of currency 
mismatches is that exchange rate fluctuations induced by capital flows (real appreciation 
during capital account booms, depreciation during crises) generate pro-cyclical wealth 
effects.  Maturity mismatches imply that domestic private and public sectors agents 
finance long-term investment with short term finance.  This means that debtors face 
stronger interest rate risks, and that refinancing requirements associated with debt 
rotation are high and may lead to bankruptcy during crises. 
It is important to note that, although the boom of local currency debt markets that 
has taken place in the developing world since the Asian crisis partly corrects the original 
sin, it may just substitute maturity mismatches for currency mismatches.  Furthermore, 
the demand for local currency instruments depends on expectations of exchange rate 
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appreciation, and may therefore lead to outflows when there are expectations of 
depreciation, as the current crisis has demonstrated.  This implies that a more precise 
definition of original sin should refer to the absence of a stable net demand, in 
international markets, for assets denominated in the currencies of developing countries.  
Obviously, domestic agents who do have a permanent demand for assets denominated in 
developing countries’ currencies, also respond in a speculative way to exchange rate 
expectations. 
All of these factors imply that integration of developing countries into global 
financial markets is always a segmented integration—that is, integration into a market 
that is segmented by the risk category according to which borrowers are bundled, and one 
in which high-risk borrowers are subject to strong pro-cyclical swings (Frenkel, 2008).  
There is, indeed, overwhelming empirical evidence that capital flows to developing 
countries are pro-cyclical and thus exacerbate rather than dampen both booms and 
recessions (Prasad et al., 2003). 
The volatility that developing countries face includes short-term fluctuations, such 
as the erratic behavior of short-term capital flows, or the very intense upward movement 
of spreads and the periods of total rationing of financing observed during the Mexican, 
Asian, and the Russian crises as well as the recent world financial meltdown.  Equally 
important, however, are the medium-term cycles in the availability and costs (spreads) of 
financing that these countries face.  Since the mid-1970s, three full medium-term cycles 
were experienced: a boom of external financing in the 1970s, followed by a major debt 
crisis in the 1980s; a new boom in the 1990s, followed by a sharp reduction in net flows 
after the succession of the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-98; and a new boom since 
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2002-03 that had already come to a close in mid-2008, prior to the global financial 
meltdown of September 2008, which obviously accelerated this process. 
Financial asymmetries also generate important macroeconomic asymmetries.  In 
particular, whereas major industrial countries have large room to maneuver to adopt 
counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies, developing countries face significant 
constraints to do so (Ocampo, 2008; Stiglitz et al., 2006).  There is indeed ample 
evidence that macroeconomic policies in developing countries are pro-cyclical 
(Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh, 2004) and that this pro-cyclical behavior has adverse 
effects on growth (Ocampo and Vos, 2008, ch. IV).  
However, within the limited maneuvering room that these countries have, there is 
a strong rationale for the adoption of the counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies that 
are available, aiming either at correcting the direct source of the disturbance, capital 
account volatility (through capital account regulations), or its macroeconomic effects.  
Although there have been movements in several policy directions, the most common one 
during the recent boom was the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves. 
The basic rationale for foreign reserve accumulation during booms is to smooth 
out the effects of pro-cyclical capital flows on exchange rates. If adequately sterilized, 
such policy makes it possible to target both the exchange rate and the interest rate, thus 
avoiding (within some limits) the trilemma of open economies (Frenkel, 2007).  A similar 
logic applies to primary commodity exporting countries facing terms of trade shocks.  
Indeed, saving some of the exceptional export revenues and associated fiscal revenues 
has long been accepted as a good practice.  More generally, to the extent that 
international trade is pro-cyclical, export booms always have a transitory component.  It 
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makes sense therefore to respond to cyclical swings in export revenues by accumulating 
the excess supply of foreign exchange during booms to be used during the succeeding 
crises.  It is interesting to emphasize, however, that this had not been the practice in the 
past.  Rather, the tendency to overspend capital account as well as trade booms had been 
the rule rather than the exception. 
 
<Insert Figure 16.2> 
 
The very costly crises that developing countries faced in the 1980s and in late 
1990s finally led them to use reserve accumulation in an active, in some cases aggressive 
way.  As Figure 16.2 indicates, up to the 1980s, the demand for reserves by developing 
countries was not very different from that of the industrial countries, around 3 percent of 
GDP.  Since the 1990s, however, the demand for reserves by developing countries—both 
middle and low income countries alike—started to diverge radically from that of the 
industrial world (Japan was the only exception in this regard, as it also joined the reserve 
boom since the mid-1990s).  China was the most aggressive, of course, and had 
accumulated by 2007 non-gold reserves equivalent to 46.7 percent of its GDP.  But in 
2007, middle income countries, excluding China, and low income countries also held 
foreign exchange reserves equivalent to 20.6 and 16.2 percent of GDP, respectively.  In 
contrast, industrial countries excluding Japan only held reserves equivalent to 2.6 percent 
of GDP, a similar level to that of the 1970s and 1980s.  As a result of this trend, the 
annual additional demand for reserves, which had already increased in the 1990s, 
skyrocketed during the recent boom: from an annual average of $111.6 billion in 1991-97 
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to $776.9 billion in 2003-07, or from $75.3 to $430.8 billion if we exclude China and 
Japan (see Table 16.1). 
 
<Insert Table 16.1> 
 
  Although reserve accumulation had started after the Latin American crisis of the 
1980s, the Asian crisis was the most important turning point.  This turning point indicates 
that the succession of crises, particularly those since 1997, revealed the lack of adequate 
institutions to manage crises that originated in the capital account, as well as the 
excessive conditionalities attached to those that are available—i.e., emergency IMF 
financing.  The radical increase in the demand for reserves since the 1990s is, of course, a 
paradox for those who believe that exchange rate flexibility reduces the demand for 
reserves.  Actually, in the developing world, greater flexibility was accompanied by a 
higher demand for reserves.  This made flexible but highly intervened exchange rate 
regimes quite common in the developing world. 
The mercantilist motives of such accumulation have been emphasized by the 
Second Bretton Woods literature.  A reinforcing factor may be the lack of appropriate 
mechanisms for exchange rate coordination in export-led economies, which generate 
incentives to keep exchange rates competitive.  The idea that weak exchange rates and 
strong current account balances tend to accelerate economic growth in developing 
countries has, of course, a respectable tradition in the development literature.9 
However, the recent literature definitely favors self-protection against capital 
account volatility as the main motive for foreign exchange reserve accumulation in recent 
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decades (see, for example, Aizenman and Lee, 2007, and Ocampo, Kregel and Griffith-
Jones, 2007: ch. 4).  Indeed, one of the reasons why a strong current account is seen as 
one of the factors that has positive effects on growth is that it reduces the dependence on 
the volatility associated with capital flows.  If this is the major reason, it would imply that 
the motivation is really self-protection rather than mercantilism.  
The motive for self-protection against financial crises goes beyond the Guidotti-
Greenspan rule that argues that countries should keep foreign exchange reserves at least 
equivalent to short-term external liabilities.  Indeed, if managing medium-term capital 
account fluctuations is the most challenging issue, there is a precautionary demand for 
international reserves that is proportional to total external liabilities, with the proportion 
actually increasing the more open the capital account is.  The recent boom in commodity 
markets and, more generally, export revenues, also led developing countries to 
accumulate as foreign exchange reserves a proportion of the additional export revenues.  
Precautionary demands associated with the expectations that both capital inflows and 
export revenues had a strong temporary component were therefore behind the rapid rise 
in reserves in 2003-07. 
The pattern of reserve accumulation differs across countries and regions (see also 
the papers by Akyüz and Carvalho in this volume).  Three types of developing countries 
can be differentiated in this regard.  A first group includes countries with current account 
deficits for which the only source of reserve accumulation was net capital flows.  This is 
the largest group, and includes whole regions (Central and Eastern Europe, South Asia, 
and sub-Saharan Africa), including major developing countries such as India, Turkey and 
Brazil (which ceased to run a current account surplus in the last quarter of 2007), but also 
 22
a large number of smaller countries.  The second group includes countries that mixed 
current account and capital account surpluses.  The major case is China but it also 
includes several mineral exporters of Latin America.  The third are basically energy 
exporters with strong current account surplus that are net exporters of capital.  In any 
case, the major peaks in reserve accumulation over the past two decades, particularly 
2007, are clearly associated with booms in external financing, particularly when China 
and the Middle East are excluded (see Figure 16.3).10  Of course, a significant difference 
with the previous boom is that, whereas the capital account inflows led to a deterioration 
in the current account in the 1990s, it did not do so during the recent boom (or did do so, 
but rather late). 
 
<Insert Figure 16.3> 
 
A third explanation for heavy interventions in foreign exchange markets may be 
called the “financial stability” motive (Obstfeld, Shambaugh and Taylor, 2008).  The 
major argument is that financially open economies must hold reserves against capital 
flight, particularly the desire to convert money balances (defined in a broad sense) into 
foreign exchange.  However, it is difficult to separate this demand from that for self-
protection.  The fact that reserves tend to be accumulated when there are excess net 
inflows of capital is the best demonstration that self-protection is the dominant motive. 
This behavior raises, of course, some interesting policy questions.  From the point 
of view of the individual countries, the most important is that capital account 
liberalization forces developing countries to absorb net capital inflows in the form of 
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additional foreign exchange reserves—that is, to deepen both sides of the national 
balance sheet.  This is costly and, in a sense, destroys the rationale for capital inflows in 
the first place, which is to transfer resources from rich to poorer countries.  It also implies 
that the additional rationale for capital account liberalization, to diversify risks, is clearly 
insufficient, as countries feel in any case that they need the additional self-protection in 
the form of larger foreign exchange reserves. 
For the issue at hand in this paper, what matters, however, is the fact that this 
strong counter-cyclical rationale generates fallacy of composition effects that feed into 
global imbalances.  Indeed, if a large group of developing countries follows this route, 
they generate a current account surplus and an additional demand for safe assets that has 
contractionary effects on the world economy unless it is matched by current account 
deficits and the supply of those assets by industrial countries. 
Therefore, self-protection is not only a costly form of insurance for individual 
countries (Rodrik, 2006) but is also a source of instability to the global economy.  
However, the problem cannot be solved simply by asking developing countries to 
appreciate their currencies to correct their balance of payments surpluses.  It must first 
solve the source of the demand for self-protection, which are strong pro-cyclical capital 
and trade flows and the lack of adequate supply of collective insurance against balance of 
payments crises.  In the latter case, the problem has many similarities with the instability 
that a national banking system faced in the past in the absence of a lender of last resort.  
So, a mix of more active use of capital account regulations and better collective insurance 
against crises would be the only ways to reduce the strong prudential demand for foreign 
exchange reserves. 
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 Reforming the system 
 
The major conclusion of this paper is that the current global reserve system exhibits three 
fundamental flaws.  First, it shows the deflationary bias associated with any system in 
which all the burden of adjustment falls on deficit countries (the anti-Keynesian bias).  
Second, it is inherently unstable due to two distinct features: the use of a national 
currency as the major reserve asset (the Triffin dilemma) and the high demand for self-
protection that developing countries face (the inequity-instability link).  The latter is 
related, in turn, to the mix of highly pro-cyclical capital flows and (till now) the absence 
of adequate supply of “collective insurance” to manage balance of payments crises, 
which generate a high demand for foreign exchange reserves by developing countries.  
This implies, third, that the system is inequitable (the inequity bias), and that such 
inequities have grown as developing countries have accumulated large quantities of 
foreign exchange reserves. 
 There could be several potential ways to reform the system, but as pointed out in 
the first section of this paper, the easiest way would be to complete the expectations of 
the reforms of the 1960s, when SDRs were created.  Obviously, the role of SDRs has 
changed, particularly in light of the fiduciary dollar standard that arose in the early 1970s.  
The issues of adequate provision of international liquidity that were at the center of early 
post-war debates, and were still much in fashion in the 1960s, are not important now, 
except during extraordinary conjunctures such as those generated during the severe 
shortage of liquidity created by the world financial collapse of September and October 
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2008.  Actually, as we have seen, the fiduciary dollar standard may actually exhibit an 
inflationary bias during long periods.  However, other problems that were also receiving 
attention in the 1960s continue to be paramount or are even more important today; 
particularly this includes those associated with the composition of world reserves, the 
access to liquidity by developing countries and associated equity issues.11 
Any reform effort must considerably increase the size of IMF, which has lagged 
significantly behind the size of the world economy since the 1998 quota review and 
relative to world capital flows since the 1970s.12 Note that in this regard, the way the 
Fund is financed is essential.  SDR allocations and quota increases are much better 
mechanisms than “arrangements to borrow”, in their different modalities—the major 
option chosen in April 2009 by the G-20, as in the past, to make more resources available 
to the Fund during crises.13 The quota system could be improved by making 
contributions exclusively in the currencies of the member countries, thus eliminating the 
obligation of developing countries to make a fourth of their contribution in SDRs or hard
currencies; this would make quotas equivalent to a generalized swap arrangement among 
central banks. However, the best alternative is to move into a fully SDR-based IMF.  As
Polak (2005, part II), and Keynes suggested during the debates leading to the creation o
the IMF, one advantage of a system based on a truly global reserve currency is that it 
would eliminate the need for the IMF to manage a multiplicity of currencies, only a





No allocations of SDRs have been made since 1981.  The IMF Board of 
Governors agreed in 1997 on a special one-time allocation, but the associated reform of 
the IMF Articles of Agreement was not approved by U.S. Congress and therefore the 
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reform has not been made effective.  The G-20 made a call in April 2009 to finish this 
process and make an additional issue of SDRs equivalent to $250 billion.  The cessation 
of SDR allocations over more than a quarter century had negative effects for developing 
countries and the world economy, as it actually coincided with their growing demand for 
foreign exchange reserves. 
Several proposals to renew SDR allocations have been made in recent years, 
following two different models.  The first is issuing SDRs in a counter-cyclical way, 
concentrating them essentially in periods of world financial stress and possibly 
destroying them partly once financial conditions normalize (United Nations, 1999; 
Camdessus, 2000; Ocampo, 2002; Akyüz, 2005).  This would develop a counter-cyclical 
element in world liquidity management, along the lines suggested below.  The second 
model proposes regular allocations of SDRs similar to the additional world demand for 
reserves, which according to Table 16.1 is at least $100-150 billion a year, if we leave 
aside the exceptional recent period of reserve accumulation.  This is also the magnitude 
of SDRs that must be issued in the long term under a counter-cyclical rule. 
Moving into a fully SDR-based IMF with a clear counter-cyclical focus would 
involve two dimensions.  The first would be to make counter-cyclical allocations of 
SDRs, which would represent, in the traditional terminology, “unconditional” liquidity.  
The second would involve financing all IMF lending with SDRs.  One alternative in this 
regard is that proposed by Polak (2005, ch. 7-8), according to which IMF lending during 
crises would actually create new SDRs, similar to how domestic credit by national central 
banks creates money.  SDRs in circulation would in turn be automatically destroyed once 
such loans are paid for.14  The other alternative would be to tie the counter-cyclical issues 
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of SDRs with IMF financing during crises, by treating SDRs that are not used by 
countries as deposits in (or lending to) the IMF that can be used by the institution to lend 
to countries in need.15  In either of the two options, SDR-funded IMF financing would 
improve the provision of collective insurance. 
For this to work, it is of course essential that IMF credit lines, their conditionality 
and the stigma associated with borrowing from this institution be overcome, so that 
countries would actually prefer collective insurance over self-protection.  Although there 
have been recent efforts to improve IMF lending facilities, particularly the March 2009 
reforms, it remains to be seen whether they solve these problems.  In particular, we still 
have to see whether the new Flexible Credit Line for crisis prevention purposes would 
meet the purpose that its predecessors (the Contingency Credit Line and the Short-Term 
Liquidity Facility) failed to do.  This credit line has, as its predecessors, the problem that 
it unduly divides developing countries in two categories, those with good policies and 
those with bad policies, which is not only a very unclear division to draw but also 
generates significant additional risks for the latter.  So, it is perhaps time to adopt at least 
one part of Keynes’ original plan for a post-war arrangement: the creation of generous 
overdraft (or in the terminology of the Fund, drawing) facilities that can be used 
unconditionally by all IMF members up to a certain cap and for a pre-established time 
period.  Collective insurance would provide both unconditional and conditional lending. 
A major problem that this reform faces is that current IMF quota allocations and 
borrowing limits, which are also the basis for SDR issues, do not reflect the realities of 
the world economy today.  Aside from the issues that have been discussed in the recent 
debates on IMF quotas, which have led to some marginal improvements, the even more 
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important issue is the huge disparity in the demand for reserves by developing vs. 
industrial economies, which are at the center of both the inequities of the current reserve 
system and the inequity-instability links highlighted in this paper.  This problem can be 
corrected only with either one or a mix of three types of reforms (since they are not 
mutually exclusive).  They should be combined, anyway, with the previous proposals on 
SDR allocations and SDR-funded collective insurance, which represents the hard core of 
the reform proposal. 
The first is an asymmetric issuance of SDRs, which would imply that all or a 
larger proportion of allocations would be given to those countries with the highest 
demand for reserves—i.e., essentially developing countries.  
The second proposal would be to create a clear development link in SDR 
allocations.  One of the proposals on the table is the use of allocation to industrial 
countries to finance additional aid for the poorest countries and the provision of global 
public goods (Stiglitz 2006, ch. 9).  This proposal has many virtues but poses the problem 
that such transfers are fiscal in character, and may thus require in every case the approval 
of national parliaments.  The alternative would be a scheme similar to that proposed by 
the Group of Experts convened by UNCTAD in the 1960s (UNCTAD, 1965), which 
would allow the IMF to buy bonds from multilateral development banks with the SDRs 
that are not utilized by member states, which would then finance the demands for long-
term resources by developing countries. 
The third is encouraging the creation of regional reserve arrangements among 
developing countries—such as the Latin American Reserve Fund and the Chiang Mai 
Agreement—that provide a complementary form of collective insurance.  A major 
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incentive to the formation of such regional arrangements would be a provision that 
allocations of SDRs would be proportional not only to IMF quotas but also to reserves 
that developing countries have placed in common reserve funds—thus making pooled 
reserves equivalent to IMF quotas for this purpose (United Nations, 1999; Ocampo, 
2002). 
An active use of SDRs with some mix of these features would go a long way to 
correct the major problems that the current system has, with perhaps one exception: the 
anti-Keynesian bias.  The proposal to put in place Keynes’ overdraft facility is perhaps 
the best recommendation in that regard.  An additional step would be to force all 
countries to keep a minimum proportion of (or even all) their foreign exchange beyond a 
certain level in the IMF, again in the form of SDRs. Allocations of SDRs could also be 
denied to those countries with “excessive reserves.”  The definition of excessive reserves 
would have to take into account, of course, the exceptional demand by developing 
countries for such reserves due to the pro-cyclicality of finance and trade (particularly, 
but not only, terms of trade) volatility. 
The current environment could actually be a good time to introduce these reforms.  
First, the inflationary risks associated with SDR issues are minimal.16 Secondly, the 
United States has embarked on a large fiscal deficit and an aggressive monetary strategy.  
This has potential implications for the stability of the current reserve system, as some 
countries (particularly China) have already indicated.  Under the current circumstances, 
the U.S. might actually find its role at the center of the global monetary system quite 
uncomfortable, as it could eventually constrain its policy freedom.  Also, as indicated 
above, by giving up its dominant reserve currency status, the U.S. would also free itself 
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from the need to generate current account deficits to provide world liquidity, which have 
adverse aggregate demand effect on its economy. 
In any case, it must be emphasized that giving up the role of the dollar as the 
major reserve currency would still keep its role as the major international means of 
payment, unless the SDRs are used in broader financial transactions, as some have 
suggested in the past (Kenen, 1983; Polak, 2005, part II).  Although this is a possibility 
for the future of the SDRs or an alternative global reserve asset, it is preferable to 
concentrate current reforms on enhancing its capacity to serve as a reserve asset, thus 
limiting its holding to central banks and a few other institutions.  The use of the dollar as 
a means of payments increases the demands for the services of the U.S. financial system, 
and have other implications for the U.S. that have been explored by other authors (see, 
for example, Cooper, 1987, ch. 7).  It remains to be seen, of course, whether the ongoing 
financial crisis will have permanent effects on the role of the U.S. as the world’s major 
banker. 
The reform of the global reserve system is obviously only part of the reform of 
the global financial architecture.  There are several complementary reforms that can help 
alleviate some of the problems of the system and strengthen, in particular, the counter-
cyclical dimensions of the global financial architecture.  As argued by Ocampo and 
Griffith-Jones (2008), this should be the essential framework for redesigning such 
architecture from the perspective of developing countries, and should include a particular 
emphasis on increasing the “policy space” that these countries have to adopt counter-
cyclical macroeconomic and financial policies. 
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The first reform is the more active use of capital account regulations, particularly 
to restrict excessive capital inflows during booms.  So, the Fund should be encouraged 
not only to tolerate but actually advise countries on what regulations to impose under 
given circumstances.  In this regard, the global regulatory structure that would emerge 
from the crisis should include provisions that apply to cross-border capital movements, 
such as: generalized reserve requirements on cross-border flows, minimum stay periods, 
and prohibitions to lend in foreign currencies to economic agents that do not have 
revenues in those currencies.  The second are instruments aimed at better distributing the 
risk faced by developing countries through the business cycle (GDP-linked or 
commodity-indexed bonds) or that encourage more stable private flows (such as counter-
cyclical guarantees).  Thirdly, and very importantly, to avoid the moral hazard issues 
associated with strengthened IMF emergency financing facilities, a good international 
debt workout mechanism should be put in place (see, in this regard, Akyüz, 2005, and 
Herman, Ocampo and Spiegel, 2009). 
Finally, the reform of the global reserve system should be viewed as part of a 
broader reform aimed at placing the IMF at the center of world macroeconomic policy 
management.  Indeed, such an approach would allow the Fund to go beyond its function 
as an “emergency financier” of balance of payments crises in the developing world, the 
essential role that it has played since the mid-1970s.  Such reinforcement of the IMF 
would require strengthening the surveillance of major economies as well as its role as an 
honest broker in macroeconomic policy coordination, which has been managed through 
ad-hoc mechanisms since the 1980s (the G-5, then the G-7 and now perhaps the G-20).  
The multilateral surveillance on global imbalances launched by the Fund in 2006 was an 
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interesting step in that direction, but it lacked binding commitment by the parties and an 
accountability mechanism. 
It must also be emphasized that, despite the problems of representation that the 
IMF has, which must continue to be addressed, it is the only institution where all member 
developing countries have a voice, through their constituencies, on global 






Aizenman, J. and Lee, J.  (2007).  ‘International Reserves: Mercantilist vs. Precautionary View, Theory and 
Evidence’.  Open Economies Review, 18:2, April, pp. 191-214. 
 
Akyüz, Y.  (2005).  ‘Reforming the IMF: Back to the Drawing Board’, Third World Network, Global 
Economy Series, No. 7. 
 
Camdessus, M.  (2000).  ‘An Agenda for the IMF at the Start of the 21st Century’, Remarks at the Council 
on Foreign Relations, New York, (February). 
 
Clark, P.B. and Polak, J.J.  (2004).  ‘International Liquidity and the Role of the SDR in the International 
Monetary System’.  IMF Staff Papers, 51:1, pp. 49-71. Reproduced in Polak (2005), ch. 9. 
 
Cooper, R.  (1987).  The International Monetary System: Essays in World Economics, Cambridge, Mass.: 
MIT Press. 
 
D’Arista, J.  (1999).  ‘Reforming the Privatized International Monetary and Financial Architecture’. 
Financial Markets and Society, (November). 
 
Dooley, M.P., Folkerts-Landau, D. and Garber, P.  (2003).  ‘An Essay on the Revived Bretton Woods 
System,’ NBER Working Paper, No. 9971, (September). 
 
____, ____ and ____  (2009).  ‘Bretton Woods II Still Defines the International Monetary System’, NBER 
Working Paper, No. 14731, (February).  
 
Eichengreen, B.  (1996).  Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
___________ (2007), Global Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 
Press. 
 
____ and Hausmann, R. eds. (2005). Other People’s Money: Debt Denomination and Financial Instability 
in Emerging Market Economies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Frankel, J.  (1994).  ‘Exchange Rate Policy,’ In Martin Feldstein (ed) American Economic Policy in the 
1980s, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.293-341. 
 
Frenkel, R.  (2007).  ‘The Sustainability of Monetary Sterilization Policies’, CEPAL Review, No. 93, 
(December). 
 
___________  (2008).  ‘From the Boom in Capital Inflows to Financial Traps,’ in José Antonio Ocampo 
and Joseph E. Stiglitz (eds.), Capital Market Liberalization and Development, New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Hart, A. G., Kaldor, N. and Tinbergen, J.  (1964).  ‘The Case for an International Commodity Reserve 
Currency’, Geneva: UNCTAD. Reproduced in Nicholas Kaldor, Essays on Economic Policy II: 
Vol. IV of Collected Economic Essays, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1980, ch. 18. 
 
Herman, B., Ocampo, J.A. and Spiegel, S. eds. (2009).  Overcoming Developing Country Debt Crises, New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2009).  ‘Review of the Adequacy of and Options for Supplementing 
Fund Resources’, January 12. 
 
 34
Kaminsky, G.L., Reinhart, C.M. and Végh, C.A.  (2004).  ‘When It Rains, It Pours: Procyclical Capital 
Flows and Macroeconomic Policies.’ NBER Working Paper No. 10780, (September). 
 
Kenen, P.B.  (1983).  ‘Use of SDR to Supplement or Substitute for Other Means of Finance’.  in George M. 
von Furstenberg (ed.), International Money and Credit: The Policy Roles, Washington D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund, ch. 7. 
 
___________  (2001).  The International Financial Architecture: What’s New? What’s Missing?’.  
Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics.  
 
Keynes, J.M.  (1942-43).  ‘The Keynes Plan,’ reproduced in J. Keith Horsefield (ed.), The International 
Monetary Fund 1945-1965: Twenty Years of International Monetary Cooperation, Vol. III: 
Documents, Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1969, pp. 3-36. 
 
Kindleberger, C.P.  (1978).  Maniacs, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
 
Minsky, H.P.  (1982).  ‘The Financial Instability Hypothesis: A Restatement,’ in Can ‘It’ Happen Again? 
Essays on Instability and Finance, Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, ch. 5. 
 
Obstfeld, M., Shambaugh, J.C. and Taylor, A.M.  (2008).  ‘Financial Stability, The Trilemma, and 
International Reserves,’ NBER Working Paper 14217 (August). 
 
Ocampo, J.A.  (2002).  ‘Recasting the International Financial Agenda,’ in John Eatwell and Lance Taylor 
(eds.), International Capital Markets: Systems in Transition, New York: Oxford University Press, 
pp. 41-73. 
 
___________  (2007/08).  ‘The Instability and Inequities of the Global Reserve System’, International Journal 
of Political Economy, Nol. 36, No. 4, Winter. 
 
___________  (2008).  ‘A Broad View of Macroeconomic Stability’, in Narcis Serra and Joseph E. Stiglitz 
(eds.), The Washington Consensus Reconsidered: Towards a New Global Governance, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
___________ and Juan Martin  (2003).  Globalization and Development: A Latin American and Caribbean 
Perspective, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, Economic Commission for Latin America and 
the Caribbean and World Bank. 
 
___________, Kregel, J. and Griffith-Jones, S.  (2007).  International Finance and Development, London: 
Zed Books. 
 
___________, and Griffith-Jones, S.  (2008).  ‘A Counter-cyclical Framework for a Development-friendly 
International Financial Architecture’, in José María Fanelli (ed.), Macroeconomic Volatility, 
Institutions and Financial Architecture: The Developing World Experience, Houndmills: 
Palgrave/Macmillan. 
 
___________, and Vos, R.  (2008).  Uneven Economic Development. Hyderabad, London and Penang: 
Orient Longman, Zed Books and Third World Network. 
 
Polak, Jacques J. (2005), Economic Theory and Financial Policy: Selected Essays of Jacques J. Polak 
1994-2004, edited by James M. Boughton, Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. 
 
Prasad, E.S., Rogoff, K., Wei, S.J. and Rose, M.A.  (2003).  ‘Effects of Financial Globalization on 
Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence’, Washington D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund, Occasional Paper 220. 
 
 35
Rodrik, D.  (2006).  ‘The Social Costs of Foreign Exchange Reserves’.  International Economic Journal. 
Vol. 20, No. 3, September. 
 
Solomon, R.  (1977).  The International Monetary System 1945-1976: An Insider’s View, New York: 
Harper & Row. 
 
Stiglitz, J.E.  (2006).  Making Globalization Work, New York: W.W. Norton. 
 
___________, Ocampo, J.A., Spiegel, S., Ffrench-Davis, R. and Nayyar, D.  (2006).  Stability with 
Growth: Macroeconomics, Liberalization, and Development, New York: Oxford University Press.  
 
Summers, L.H.  (2004).  ‘The U.S. Current Account Deficit and the Global Economy,’ Per Jacobson 
Lecture, Washington D.C. 
 
Triffin, R.  (1961).  Gold and the Dollar Crisis (Revised edition). New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
___________  (1968)  Our International Monetary System: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, New York: 
Random House. 
 
Truman, E.M.  (2008).  ‘On What Terms Is the IMF Worth Funding?’.  Working Paper 08-11, Washington, 
D.C.: Peterson Institute for International Economics.  
 
UNCTAD  (1965).  International Monetary Issues and the Developing Countries: Report of the Group of 
Experts, New York: United Nations. 
 
United Nations  (1999).  ‘Towards a New International Financial Architecture: Report of the Task Force of 
the Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations’, 
http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ecesa/ecesa-1.pdf. 
 
United Nations  (2001).  Report of the High-level Panel on Financing for Development (Zedillo Report), 
www.un.org/reports/financing. 
 
United Nations  (2005).  World Economic Situation and Prospects 2005. New York: United Nations. 
 
White, W.R.  (2005).  ‘Procyclicality in the Financial System: Do We Need a New Macrofinancial 
Stabilization Framework?’.  Kiel Economic Policy Papers. Kiel: Kiel Institute for Economic 
Policy, September. 
 
Williamson, J.  (2004).  ‘The Future of the Global Financial System.’ Journal of Post-Keynesian 
Economics, 26, no. 4, Summer. 
 36
 37
                                                
 
 
1 Professor and co-President of the Initiative for Policy Dialogue at Columbia University. Former Under-
Secretary General of the United Nations for Economic and Social Affairs and Executive Secretary of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, and former Minister of Finance of Colombia. 
The views expressed in this paper have been enriched by debates that have taken place in the Commission 
of Experts of the UN General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System, 
led by Joseph E. Stiglitz, of which the author is a member (see also in this regard the paper by Greenwald 
and Stiglitz in this volume). I am also grateful to Jomo K. S., Thomas Palley, Lance Taylor, Eduardo 
Wiesner and John Williamson for detailed comments on a previous draft. The paper also draws in part from 
Ocampo (2007/8), with permission from M. E. Sharp. Support from the Ford Foundation is kindly 
acknowledged. 
2 I will follow the convention of referring to the biases or risks as “deflationary” or “inflationary”, although 
they may affect the level of economic activity rather than the price level, and therefore could rather be 
called “contractionary” or “expansionary”. 
3 In this regard, see the contribution of Carvalho to this volume. 
4 See also the interesting proposal made in the 1960s to design a commodity-based reserve system, which 
has interesting counter-cyclical features (Hart, Kaldor and Tinbergen, 1964). I put aside a discussion of a 
return to a gold standard, which collapsed on its own right and would be unviable under the “embedded 
liberalism” of the post-Second World War arrangements, as emphasized by Eichengreen (1996). 
5 See Frankel (1994) for a detailed account of these development and efforts at international policy 
coordination during the 1980s. 
6 The preference of China for an orderly appreciation since 2005 seems to be grounded in similar concerns. 
7 This assumes that these countries (particularly, developing countries) have net liabilities denominated in 
foreign currencies. Of course, there are agents that profit from depreciation (those with net assets in foreign 
currencies) as well as losers (agents with net liabilities in foreign currencies). If the country has positive net 
assets (a characteristic that more developing countries have as the result of the large foreign exchange 
reserves accumulated in recent years), the real balance effect would be positive, but there will still be 
distributive effects. 
8 This generates an additional set of asymmetries that I will not analyze here. I refer to the fact that poorer 
countries as well as small firms in all developing countries have very limited or no access to international 
financial markets. Countries with a poor track record will also have more limited access to these markets. 
9 See a survey of this literature in the contribution of Frenkel and Rapetti to this volume. 
10 For this group of countries, whereas the correlation of variation of reserves with net capital flows (both 
as a proportion of GDP) is 0.715 for the period 1982-2007 as a whole, that between the current account and 
reserve accumulation is actually negative and not statistically significant (-0.165). 
11 See good summaries of the debates of the 1960s in Solomon (1977) and Triffin (1968) and an interesting 
contrast between the role of SDRs then and now in Clark and Polak (2004). 
12 See IMF (2009) and an analysis of different financing options in Truman (2008). 
13 On the deficiencies of arrangements to borrow, see Kenen (2001). 
14 There would of course be limits on total lending (the total “quotas” of member states, which would now 
have a fairly notional sense, except that they would be the basis for SDR allocations and perhaps to 
determine who bears the costs of running the Fund. 
15 Any of these proposals would involve eliminating the division between what are called the General 
Resource the SDR Accounts. See Polak (2005, part II) and Cooper (1987), ch. 12. 
16 They are probably minimal even in normal times, as the $100-150 billion represent less than 0.2 and 0.3 
percent of world GDP, respectively. 
